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Abstract 

This paper examines the political responses of German automobile firms to the 1992 Single Market initiative. I 
argue that the decision by firms to try to influence EC policies depends on the perceived economic impact of the 
single market and ,the market alternative open to firms, while the decision on how to lobby depends on the size 
of the finn and the institutional and strategic environment in which a firm operates. I use this framework to 
explain why German automobile firms were slow in responding the single market initiative and why, when 
they did choose to lobby, the firms pursued different political strategies. The research suggests that we should 
not limit our studies to the political activity of trade associations and sectors, but should also examine the 
political strategies and activities of individual firms. It also suggests that, as integration efforts in Europe 
proceed, there is likely to be increased activity by individual firms and national associations because European 
trade associations may not be able to agree on specific EC policy proposals. 
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Introduction 
The decision by the European Community (EC) to complete the 
single European market presents European firms with significant 
opportunities and risks. On the one hand, removing the remaining 
barriers to trade between the 12 member states will create new 
markets and result in substantial cost-savings for some firms. On 
the other hand, it will pave the way for increased competition and 
for the removal of long-standing systems of protection, which may 
threaten the viability of some firms. Firms, aware of these 
opportunities and risks, are not sitting idly by waiting for the 
European Community to work out the details of the program. They 
are seeking to shape both the scope and pace of integration 
efforts. 
However, firms and trade associations can no longer depend on 
their traditional ways of influencing EC integration policy because 
of changes in the decisionmaking rules in the Community. Under the 
Single European Act, which took effect in 1987, the Council of 
Ministers now votes on internal market matters using a system of 
qualified majority voting rather than unanimity.1 This means that 
one country can no longer veto legislation simply by voting against 
it. It also means that on many issues, firms and associations can 
no longer simply lobby their national government in the hope that 
it will block legislation in the Council of Ministers. Instead, 
firms and associations must seek to build alliances in the European 
arena and directly lobby EC officials early in the policy process. 
As one Brussels lobbyist interviewed for this study noted, 
Up until two years ago, the main focus was on the 
national capitals ... Now you cannot do as much over the 
national level •.• It is not that national contacts are 
superfluous, but Brussels is becoming more and more 
important. 2 
The result of this change has been an explosion of lobbying 
activity in the European Community. Whereas in 1985 there were 654 
registered interest groufs in Brussels, by 1988, the number had 
almost doubled to 1336. In addition to new lobbying groups, 
lUnder qualified majority voting, each country of the 12 member countries receives between 2 and 10 
votes, depending on its size. There are a total of 76 votes and 54 are needed to pass any piece of legislation. 
Certain decisions, such as those regarding the harmonization of taxes and the removal of frontier controls 
were exempted from this provision. 
2Intel"View, February 28, 1991. 
3Most of these represented business interests. Of the 654 groups in 1985, for example, 332 were 
industrial associations, 139were groups representing commerce, six were craft and artisan associations, and 
five were associations representing small and medium sized finns. See Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe 
1 
2 
trade associations and firms that already had political 
representatives in Brussels, are beefing up their operations. 4 
Indeed, there are so many new interest group representatives 
clamoring for appointments with Commission officials, that one long 
time German lobbyist in Brussels complained it is almost impossible 
to get work done anymore. s 
Not only are there many more lobbyists in Brussels, but the 
types of EC lobbyists are changing. Many of these new lobbyists 
are not the European level trade associations that the neo­
functionalist literature suggested would dominate European 
policymaking in Brussels as integration efforts proceeded. 6 
Instead, there are many individual firms, consultants, national 
associations and regional representatives lobbying EC officials 
directly.? 
The difficulty for firms and trade associations is that there 
are few formal procedures regulating the participation of business 
groups in the EC. As a result, there is no unified picture of 
contacts between business and the EC. Some firms lobby the 
Commission directly i some hire consultants; some work through 
national associations; and still others lobby as part of a European 
trade association. Some firms continue to work primarily on the 
national level, while others have opened offices in Brussels. It 
is, as Schmitter and Streeck suggest, a pluralistic system with 
Schmitter, "From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single 
European Market," Politics and Society 19 (1991), p. 137. 
4For example, UNICE, the European industrial trade association, increased its budget by one third in 
1990 and significantly increased its staff in 1991. The Confederation of British Industry increased its number 
of employees in its Brussels office from one full-time and one half-time person to three full time and one half 
time person in 1990. It also sent in an older, more experienced person to head up the Brussels office. Even 
trade groups such as the British Food Association and the German Insurance Association, which decided not 
to open their own offices in Brussels, began sending a representative to Brussels about once a week. 
5Interview, February 27, 1991. 
6See, for example, Ernst Haas, The Uniting ofEurope: Political. Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
(London: Stevens and Sons, 1958). Haas stresses the importance of transnational groups and supranational 
institutions in promoting integration efforts. In a 1981 study, Kirchner and Schwaiger note that EC 
institutions are "only prepared to let European interest groups have a say in Community decision making. 
They are not prepared to let national or predominately nationally-oriented organizations air their views or 
participate in decisionrnaking." Emil Kirchner and Konrad Schwaiger, The Role of Interest Groups in the 
European Community, Aldershot: Gower Publishing 1981, p. 39. My interviews suggest this is no longer 
the case. 
7See Svein Andersen and Kjell Eliassen, "European Community Lobbying," European Journal of Political 
Research, 20 (1991): 173-87. 
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contacts occurring at all levels. 8 
Understanding the political choices that firms make in this 
period of institutional flux is important because the strategies 
they now choose will have a large impact on which patterns of 
lobbying evolve and become institutionalized in the future. 
Unfortunately, the European integration literature gives us few 
tools for understanding this development. Much of the traditional 
integration literature focuses on why integration occurs rather 
than on how groups organize to try to influence integration 
efforts. 9 studies that do examine the organization and activity 
of interest groups in the EC were generally written prior to the 
passage of the Single European Act and are, to a large extent, 
outdated. 10 They also tend to focus on the activities of trade 
associations or sectors, rather than on firms, despite the 
increasing importance of direct lobbying by firms in the EC. 11 
In this paper, I examine how German automobile firms have 
responded politically to the 1992 single European Market 
8Streeck and Schmitter, "From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism," 1991. 
9For a summary of the various approaches, see H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb, eds. Policy-Making 
in the European Communities. (London: Wiley, 1977), especially Ch, 1. 
l00rhese studies include: W. Averyt, "Eurogroups, Clientela, and the EC," International Organization, 29 
(1975): 949-972; Alan Butt Philip, 'Pressure Group Power in the European Community," Intereconomics, 
6 (1987): 282-289; W. Feld, "National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC: Political 
Science Quarterly. 81 (1966): 392-411; Horst Fiedler, "Monopolverb:inde in der Westeuropaische 
Gemeinschaft,· Zeitschrift fUr Geschichtswissenschaft, 8 (1986): 675-683; Emil Kirchner and Konrad 
Schwaiger, The Role of Interest Groups in the European Community, (Aldershot: Gower, 1981); K.M. 
Meessen, Verbande und europaische Integration, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1980); Hans-Wolfgang Platzer, 
Unternehmensverbande in der EG -- ihre nationale und transnationale Organization und Politik, (Kehl am 
Rhein: N.P. Engel Verlag, 1984); Jane Sargent, ·Pressure Group Development in the EC: The Role of the 
British Bankers' Association," Journal of Common Market Studies, (March 1982): 269-285; and DUsan 
Sidjanski, "Pressure groups and the European Community," Government and Opposition. 2 (1967):397-416. 
More recent studies of EC interest group activity include Andersen and Eliasson, "European Community 
Lobbying," 1991; Streeck and Schmitter, "From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: 1991; and 
Jane Sargent, "The Organisation of Business Interests for European Community Representation," in Wyn 
Grant, Business and Politics in Britain, (London: MacMillan, 1987). 
]]There are some exceptions including Andersen and Eliasson, "European Community Lobbying," 1991; 
and Roland Stephen, "Domestic Interests, Interstate Bargains and European Integration: The Case of the 
Automobile Sector," Paper delivered at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September 3-6, 1992. See also J. Zysman and W. Sandholtz, "1992: Recasting the European 
Bargain,' World Politics, 42 (October 1989): pp. 95-128, for a discussion of the importance of multinational 
corporations in the passage of the Single Market initiative. 
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initiative. 12 In the first section of the paper, I explore two 
questions -- when do firms choose to lobby and how do firms choose 
to lobby. I argue that the decision to lobby will depend on the 
perceived economic impact of the single European market and the 
market alternatives open to firms, while the decision how to lobby 
depends on the size of the firm and the institutional and strategic 
environment in which a firm operates. In the second section, I use 
this framework to explore the political strategies of German 
automakers. I explain why German firms were slow in responding to 
the single market initiative and why, when German automobile firms 
did choose to lobby, they pursued different political strategies. 
In the final section of the paper, I discuss the broader 
implications of this research for European integration studies and 
for the more general study of political economy. 
* * * 
The institutional and political changes in Brussels in the 
mid-1980s raise important questions for European firms. What 
economic and political consequences will the single market have for 
firms? How can firms most effectively influence EC single market 
policies? Are activities at the national level or reliance on 
European level trade associations still sufficient? 
To answer these questions, we must first examine why firms 
choose to lobby in response to the single market initiative. 
Undertaking political activity such as lobbying is a costly and 
uncertain strategy for firms. It requires time, personnel, money, 
and information. Firms have limited resources they can use to 
pursue these political strategies. They must consider whether it 
is worth investing these limited resources in political activity or 
whether they might be better spent engaging in other activities 
such as making market adjustments. 
Whether a firm chooses to engage in lobbying activities will 
depend' on the perceived impact of the single market on its 
operations and its ability to make economic adjustments in response 
to the single market initiative. 13 The perceived impact is simply 
12This is part of a larger study that examines the political responses of German and British firms to the 
1992 Single Market Program. In that project, I analyze the political responses of firms in four sectors -­
automobiles, insurance, beer brewing, and trucking. See P. Camerra-Rowe, "Lobbying in the New Europe: 
Political Responses of Firms to the 1992 Single Market Program," Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University 
(forthcoming, 1994). 
13The approach I use here is similar to Jeffry Frieden's in Debt, Development and Democracy, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Frieden argues that the economic characteristics of a firm will 
determine whether it will seek government policies and what sort of policies it seeks. In particular, he 
suggests that the incentive to lobby increases with the specificity of a firm's or sector's assets. The difference 
in the approaches is that Frieden focuses on collective political activity rather than on the political activity 
of individual firms. He also does not seek to explain the channels firms pursue to influence policy. 
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how susceptible the firm feels it is to the changing market 
conditions that will result from the completion of the single 
market. This evaluation depends on such economic factors as the 
competitive position of a firm, its degree of regulation or 
government subsidies, and the structure of its markets. 14 Highly 
regulated firms, for example, are likely to fear that the EC's 
policies will significantly increase competition and require major 
economic readjustment. Firms with local markets are more likely to 
believe that the single market will have little impact on their 
operations. 
The response of a firm will also depend on its ability to 
undertake market strategies to adapt to the post-1992 market. Here 
again it is primarily economic factors that are important in a 
firm's evaluation. For some firms, high fixed costs or commitment 
to a particular product line limit the ability to exit the market 
easily or to make economic adjustments. Others will be unable to 
take advantage of economies of scale offered by the single market. 
The only alternative for such firms may be to use voice -- or 
political activity -- to try to influence policy.15 
Based on their market position and their ability to make 
economic adjustments, firms fall into one of four categories -­
they may believe they will not be affected by changes in market 
structure; they may perceive themselves as negatively affected by 
the single market but be able to make economic adjustments or exit 
the market; they may perceive themselves as negatively affected, 
but be unable to make significant economic adjustments; or they may 
anticipate benefitting from the single market. 
The lobbying activity that these firms undertake will vary in 
degree and intensity. Firms that do not anticipate that the single 
market will affect their economic position will not invest scarce 
resources to lobby the EC. Firms that perceive themselves as 
negatively affected and have few economic alternatives will engage 
in political activity with the greatest intensity because for them 
the economic stakes are the highest. The effects of single market 
policies will be concrete and apparent -- indeed they may threaten 
the viability of individual firms. Even if a firm cannot change 
policy through political lobbying, it may be able to buy time, win 
side payments to alleviate the costs of the policy change, or 
persuade the EC to establish new EUropean-wide regulations. Firms 
that perceive themselves as negatively affected and can make 
14Por a discussion of how the single market will affect various sectors, see Paolo Cecchini, The European 
Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market, (Aldershot, England: Wildwood, 1988); Commission for 
the European Communities, "The Economics of 1992,W European Economy, No. 35 (March 1988); Ifo-Institut 
fUr Wirtschaftsforschung, Die Verwirklichung des Europaischen Binnenmarktes und die Wirtschaftspolitik, 
MOnchen: Ifo-Institut, 1989. 
lSSee A. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Lovalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
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structural adjustments or exit the market are less likely to 
undertake political activity, although they too may try to 
influence policy in order. to hedge their bets or win time to make 
economic adjustments. And finally, firms that stand to benefit from 
the single market may also choose to lobby to ensure that a policy 
is carried out or even accelerated, but again there is less 
incentive to invest scarce resources in lobbying, particularly if 
government officials are already committed to the policy. 
Moreover, the benefits of such policy changes are not as immediate 
and concrete. 
Once a firm chooses to engage in political activity, it must 
decide whether to rely on traditional methods of lobbying or 
undertake new political strategies. Should it work through its 
national or European trade association, open its own office in 
Brussels and lobby unilaterally, or ally informally with other 
similarly situated EC firms? Should it focus its efforts on the 
national or European level? The answers to these questions make up 
the pattern of lobbying activity. Firms will choose what they 
perceive to be the most effective pattern of lobbying. The pattern 
they choose will depend on three key factors -- first, the firm's 
size16 ; second, its strategic environment; and third, its 
institutional linkages to policymakers. 
It has been well established that size makes a difference in 
politics. Olson argues that small groups such as sectors with a 
small numbers of large, oligopolistic firms have an easier time 
organizing to try to influence policy.17 And firms may be able 
to obtain collective goods more easily through such collective 
action. However, the interests of firms within a sector may 
diverge considerably and this may result in unilateral political 
action. Here large firms also have an advantage because they have 
greater resources and they tend to be important political 
constituents. Governments are interested in maintaining employment 
and investment and are therefore more likely to be influenced b~1the actions of a single large firm than a single small one. 
ThUS, we are more likely to see unilateral action by large firms. 
But size alone will not determine differences in lobbying 
16Size is not a decisive factor in the automobile case study since all of the firms are large firms that 
contribute significantly to the national and EC economy. However, it is an important factor in comparing 
the political responses of firms in other sectors. 
17Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
18See, for example, Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets. (New York: Basic Books, 1977) and Stephen 
Elkin, "Pluralism in its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy," in Roger Benjamin and Robert 
Duvall, eds., The Democratic State, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 
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patterns since not all large firms will choose to lobby the EC 
unilaterally. The strategic environment of the firm is also 
critical. Here what I am referring to is, first, the position of 
the firm within a sector and, second, the position of the firm vis 
a vis the government. In terms of a firm's position within a 
sector, the number, size, mix, and economic position of firms 
within a sector will influence a firm's interests and its ability 
and willingness to cooperate politically.19 For example, a non­
competitive or marginal firm will have different interests than 
competitive firms. If the economic position of a firm within a 
sector is such that its interests diverge considerably from other 
firms in its sector, it is more likely to engage in unilateral 
lobbying in the EC. In addition, the position of national and 
European level government officials on single market policies will 
affect lobbying decisions. For example, firms that believe they 
will find inadequate support for their position at the national 
level are more likely to turn to EC lobbying efforts. 
The third factor that will affect patterns of lobbying will be 
the firm's institutional access to policymakers. Existing 
institutions will structure the lobbying strategies available to 
firms. Factors such as the organization of national and European 
trade associations, and the firm's relationship to political 
parties and government ministries will be important in determining 
whether firms engage in associative or unilateral activity.20 For 
example, those firms who are members of weak national or European 
trade associations are more likely to lobby the EC directly, than 
those who are members of well-financed, well organized national or 
European trade associations. 
Using this framework, I can generate expectations about when 
and how firms will respond to the political and institutional 
changes in the EC. In terms of which firms will lobby, those that 
believe they will be negatively affected by the single market and 
have few market alternatives are the most likely to undertake 
political lobbying activities designed to halt or slow the pace of 
integration and will do so with great intensity. Firms that 
believe they will be negatively affected and can easily make 
economic adjustments, and firms that believe they will benefit from 
the single market may also lobby, but with to a lesser extent and 
with less intensity. In terms of the patterns of lobbying, large 
19See Wyn Grant and Wolfgang Streeck, "Large finns and the representation of business interests in the 
UK and West Gennan construction indus tty," in A Cawson, ed. Organized Interests and the State, (London: 
Sage, 1985). 
2Opor example, Schmitter and Streeck argue that different institutional environments create different 
logics of influence for collective action. See Schmitter and Streeck, "The Organisation of Business Interests: 
A Research Design to Study the Associative Action of Business in the Advanced Industrial Societies of 
Western Europe," (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, 1981). See also Grant and Streeck, "Large flnns and the 
representation of business interests ...," 1985. 
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firms, firms that are part of weak national or European trade 
associations, or firms in sectors with divided economic interests, 
are more likely to engage in unilateral lobbying at the EC level. 
To explore these propositions, we examine the political 
responses of German automobile manufacturers to the single market 
initiative. 21 
* * * 
As part of the single Market Program, the European communit~ 
agreed in 1986 to complete a single market for automobiles. 2 
Completion of the single market for automobiles was viewed by the 
Commission as critical to the success of the program because of the 
importance of the sector to the European economy.23 While the EC 
had already been involved in policy making in the automobile sector 
for many years, completion of a single market in this sector still 
required establishing Community-wide type approval so that car 
manufacturers do not have to build different model cars for each 
market24 j harmonizing taxes on automobilesj and monitoring state 
aids. In addition to these issues, the completion of the single 
market for automobiles goes beyond the measures outlined in the 
Commission's White paper to include other important automobile­
related issues including the removal of national automobile import 
restrictions, external trade policy with Japan, block exemptions of 
exclusive dealerships in cars, and harmonizing environmental 
2]1 examine three manufacturers -- Daimler-Benz, BMW and Volkswagen. While I also interviewed 
officials at Porsche, I do not treat the firm separately here because they pursued strategies similar to those 
of BMW. 
22See Commission of the European Communities, "Completing the Single Market. White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council." Brussels, June 1985, especially Annex, p. 15 for sectoral proposals 
regarding motor vehicles. 
23The motor vehicle industry represents about 9% of EC industrial value-added and directly employs 1.8 
million people. It is estimated that one out of 10 jobs in the EC depends directly or indirectly on the 
automobile sector. Commission of the European Communities, Panorama of EC Industry 1990, 
(Luxembourg: EEC, 1990), p. 13-6. 
2"whUe the Commission had already proposed in 1970 to create whole vehicle type approval by 
harmonizing 44 automobile standards, French and Italian auto makers held up this process by blocking the 
harmonization of three standards regarding tires, wind shields, and weights and dimensions. French and 
Italian auto makers feared that with whole vehicle type approval, Japanese cars in countries like Denmark, 
Ireland, Germany and Great Britain, would more easily find their way into France and Italy. They refused 
to approve the remaining standards until the issue of external trade with Japan was satisfactorily resolved. 
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standards and emission controls. 25 
The removal of national automobile import restrictions and the 
external trade policy with Japan have been the most controversial 
aspects of creating a single market for automobiles. There have 
traditionally been wide differences in the number of Japanese 
imports allowed in national markets. Italy has limited the number 
of Japanese cars to under one p'ercent of its market or 
approximately 17,000 cars annually26; France has restricted 
Japanese cars to 3% of its market or about 60,000 car annually; 
Great Britain has a voluntary export restraint agreement with Japan 
that limits Japanese cars to 11% of its market. In countries with 
no restrictions, the Japanese share of the market averages 26% and 
is as high as 43%.27 
While the EC could have maintained some national restrictions 
after 1992 under Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome, removing these 
restrictions was viewed by the Commission as a key element of 
creating a single market for automobiles. As the Vice President of 
the Commission Martin Bangemann noted, 
The Single Market cannot function properly if, within it, some 
member states continue to impose quantitative restrictions. 
How could it function? How would you prevent imports from 
countries without quantitative restrictions into countries 
with quantitative restrictions? There is no practical way of 
doing it, let alone legal means ••• It is, therefore, simply 
impossible. 28 
However, removing such national restrictions would allow 
Japanese imports as well as Japanese transplants, which are 
25See Commission Communication, "A Single Community Motor Vehicle Market (10971/89), which 
outlines the specific issues the EC must address to create a single market for automobiles. For a more 
extensive discussion of the effects of the single market on the automobile industry, see A. Smith and A. 
Venables, "Automobiles," in Gary Hufbauer, ed. Europe 1992, (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1990). 
260rhe market share of Japanese cars in Italy is now close to 3 percent since the Commission has 
gradually increased the authorized parallel imports from other member countries into Italy. See Heinrich 
von Moltke, "Commentaries on Automobiles and Steel," in Claude Barfield and Mark Perlman, eds. Industry. 
Services and Agriculture: The United States Faces a United Europe. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), 
p. 101. 
27See Select Committee on the European Communities, House of Lords, "A Single Market for Cars," HL 
Paper 76, (London: HMSO, 1989), p. 6. Also A. Smith and A. Venables, "Automobiles," p. 125. 
28Martin Bangemann, "Issues and instruments of European industrial policy," in Towards a Wider 
Horizon, Daimler-Benz Publication Series "European Topics," p. 18. 
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Japanese cars made in Europe29 , to circulate freely in EC markets. 
Some analysts have argued that this would create severe adjustment 
problems for some European automakers and could possibly drive some 
European firms out of business because the competitive gap between 
Japanese and European automakers is still very wide. For example, 
it takes EC workers an average of 37 hours of work per vehicle 
produced versus 17 hours for the Japanese. In terms of 
development, it takes the Japanese 3.5 years per model compared to 
5 years for EC automakers. Finally in terms of reliability, there 
are an average of 60 defects per 100 vehicles among Japanese 
automakers compared to 105 per 100 vehicles for EC 
manufacturers. 30 Thus, whatever gains European automakers might 
make from creating a single market could be erased by the 
structural adjustments firms would have to make to compete with the 
Japanese. 
As a result of these fears, the issue of external trade with 
the Japanese became intimately linked with the discussion of a 
single market for automobiles. Firms, national governments and the 
Commission struggled to decide how long and in what form protection 
of the auto industry from the Japanese should continue. Should, 
for example, national import restrictions be replaced by EC-wide 
restrictions on automobiles? Should the Community require 
reciprocity from Japan before opening its market to Japanese 
automobiles? And how should the Community deal with Japanese 
transplants in countries like Great Britain, where Japanese 
companies have made substantial investments? The difficulties the 
Commission had in coming up with an acceptable proposal on such 
issues as trade policy towards Japan is reflected in the fact that 
it did not release an official :80sition on a single market for 
automobiles until December 1989. 
Despite the seeming controversy over creating a single market 
for automobiles, the initial response of German automobile firms to 
the plqn to complete the single automobile market was to engage in 
no new political activity. All major German automakers initially 
supported the single market initiative, but they left it to their 
national trade association, Verband der Deutschen 
29Among the EC member countries, Great Britain produces the most Japanese transplants. Nissan 
invested 400 million pounds in Great Britain by 1990. It produced 76,976 cars in Britist plants in 1989 and 
expected to produce 200,000 cars there by the end of 1992. Toyota and Honda began producing automobiles 
in Great Britain in late 1992. Statistics from The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Limited, 
London, June 1990. 
30 Select Committee on the European Communities, House of Lords, ftA Single Market For Cars/ p.50. 
For a full discussion of the differences between Japanese, American and European auto producers, see James 
Womack, Daniel Jones and Daniel Roos, The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean 
Production, (New York: Harper, 1991) 
31Commission communication, ftA Single Community Motor-Vehicle Market,ft (10971/89). 
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Automobilindustrie (VDA)i their national industrial association, 
Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (BDI); and the German 
government to represent their position. German firms were also 
represented in two European trade associations -- indirectly, 
through the VDA in the Coordinating Council of European Car 
Manufacturers (CLCA), which was made up of national trade 
associations of motor vehicle manufacturers from EC countries; and 
directly, in the Committee of Common Market Automobile Constructors 
(CCMC) which was governed by the chairmen of 12 companies -­
Peugeot, Renault, Fiat, BMW, Daimler-Benz, MAN, Porsche 
Volkswagen, Rover Group, Roll-Royce Motor Cars, DAF and volvo.3~ 
Direct contact between German automobile companies and EC officials 
was minimal. By 1989, however, this changed. Not only did some 
German automobile firms become more politically active in Brussels, 
but they took opposing positions on specific EC automobile 
policies, in particular the issue of Japanese trade policy, and 
engaged in different types of lobbying activities. This raises two 
questions. First, what led to the shift in political activity by 
German firms? and second, what accounts for the differences in the 
patterns of political activity? 
German firms were initially quite slow in responding to the 
single market program because they felt the impact of EC policy 
would be negligible. Compared to their EC counterparts, the major 
German automobile firms already operated in a fairly open and 
competitive market. Germany has no official import restrictions on 
Japanese imports, although the Japanese since 1981 have voluntarily 
limited their market share in Germany to 15%.33 This, however, 
is the highest percentage of Japanese cars in an EC member country 
with domestic car manufacturers. 
Moreover, several of the German car manufacturers suggested 
that they recognized long ago the benefits of a single market and 
had acted accordingly by establishing themselves in other European 
and foreign markets. This was particularly true for the specialty 
car manufacturers, BMW, Daimler-Benz and Porsche. Two-thirds of 
BMW's cars, for example, are sold outside of Germany. The United 
states is generally the most important market for these 
manufacturers, although in recent years they have made headway in 
Japan after making substantial investments. While Japan may only 
be their third or fourth largest export partner, it is very 
prof i table because more expensive cars are sold there. Volkswagen, 
while it is a volume producer and occupies a different market 
niche, is also a global player. It exports a large proportion of 
its cars to other countries in the EC and the rest of Western 
320n April 1, 1991, the automakers reorganize at the European level and create a single new European 
trade association called the Association de Constructeurs Europeens d'Automobiles (ACEA) to coordinate EC 
policy. Only Peugeot does not join. 
33Interview, March 21, 1991. 
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Europe. Because the major German automakers were already 
competing on a worldwide basis, they had begun in the early 1980s 
to adjust their economic strategies in order to make themselves 
more competitive. 
German automakers also benefitted from a boom in the European 
auto sector in the mid-1980s. The production of cars rose from 
10.8 million vehicles in the EC in 1985 to 13.4 million in 1988, an 
increase of 24%. In 1988 EC registration of new passenger cars 
reached record levels of 11.8 million vehicles. 34 While sales in 
Germany were weak in 1988, the German manufacturers were able to 
make gains in other countries. 
Thus, the single market seemed little threat to German firms. 
The major German car manufacturers were already well established in 
Europe, with two-thirds of all German vehicles ending up in other 
EC markets. If anything, they welcomed the EC's general initiative 
to create a single and open market because it strengthened their 
position in Europe and because it reduced the risks of a trade war 
with the Japanese. There was no incentive for German firms to 
engage in new political activity to try to influence EC policy 
since their traditional national channels of influence, as well as 
the Commission, supported their position of an open market. Direct 
contacts between the firms and EC officials remained sporadic. As 
one VW official aptly put it: "We were successful. We did not feel 
any need to change. In order for business to change it needs 
either political or economic pressure.,,35 And there was neither. 
But in 1989, this attitude began to change. There was growing 
uneasiness among some German industry officials about specific 
developments in the European community and three different patterns 
of political activity emerged. First, Daimler-Benz, which up to 
this point had no official representative in Brussels, hired an EC 
lobbyist in July 1989 and officially opened a corporate office in 
Brussels in December 1989. This off ice now serves as a public 
relations and lobbying office and as the European division of the 
firm. The firm also conducted an in-house evaluation of the 
effects of the single market on its operations. Second, VW also 
conducted an in-house evaluation of the single market and began 
pushing a more protectionist position in the EC. The firm did not 
open its own office in Brussels, but, on the issue of trade policy, 
VW allied itself with other European volume producers such as Fiat 
and Renault to lobby the Commission directly for restrictions on 
Japanese imports and transplants. Third, BMW undertook little new 
political action at this time, although company officials 
considered setting up a Brussels office. The firm continued to 
34Commission of the European Communities, Panorama of Industry 1990, (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the EC, 1990), p. 13·8. 
3SInterview, March 18, 1991. 
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work primarily through its national association, with only sporadic 
direct contact with the EC. 36 To account for this change and for 
the different patterns of political lobbying, we examine each of 
the firms in turn. 
Daimler-Benz 
Among EC automakers, Daimler-Benz has traditionally been the 
strongest supporter of a single and open European market. As a 
specialty producer, it cannot afford to rely simply on the German 
or even the European market. So it made sUbstantial investments 
abroad, which it wished to protect. Company officials believed 
that the single market would have little impact on the economic 
operations of the company since the company was already well­
established in its foreign and domestic markets and had built a 
reputation for producing high quality, reliable and durable cars. 
Indeed, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the company saw output 
rise almost every year. Since the Commission, along with the 
German government, VDA, and BDI supported Daimler's position, there 
was little need for Daimler to engage in direct lobbying in 
Brussels. Indeed, its only direct political representation was one 
official in Bonn. 
But by 1989, the firm recognized that the French automakers, 
in particular, had become much more obstinate in their demands for 
protection and the firm feared that the Commission would be 
pressured into accepting European-wide restrictions on Japanese car 
exports to the EC. This could hurt Daimler's interests because the 
Japanese would export more higher priced luxury automobiles to 
Europe. As Hanns Glatz, chief lobbyist for Daimler-Benz in 
Brussels, pointed out the Japanese have 
learned out of quantitative restrictions that if you want to 
make money on restricted volume do it by value, and second, 
they see ... that the upper end of the market is the rich end. 
But there is not, of course, unlimited space for everybody 
there, so we are getting under more pressure and this is one 
reason we are strongly opposed to quantitative 
restrictions. 37 
Daimler-Benz officials wanted to ensure that the Commission did not 
renege on its commitment to an open market. 
Moreover, they believed that the French and Italian 
3~MW has since set up an office in Brussels. It opened in early 1992. See Jeffrey Anderson, "Gennan 
Industry and the European Community in the 19905,· in Volker Berghahn, ed. European Strategies of 
Gennan Big Business, (Oxford: Berg Publishers, Inc., forthcoming 1993). 
37Select Committee on the European Communities, House of Lords, "A Single Market for Cars,· HL Paper 
76, (London: HMSO, 1990) p. 34. 
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automakers, who were pushing for more restrictive policies, were 
better organized and had more influence on the European level. Fiat 
has had an office in Brussels for many years. French automakers 
often prepared documents for the Commission before it issued its 
proposals, according to one lobbyist. 38 Daimler, on the other 
hand, did not even have a European affairs or government relations 
department to deal systematically with EC issues. Like other German 
firms, Daimler-Benz traditionally relied on its national trade 
association, which is consulted by and consults regularly with 
national government officials, to influence national and European 
level policy. 39 But the growing impression that French and 
Italian automakers were more influential on EC policies, which 
could significantly affect Daimler's economic interests, prompted 
the firm to reconsider its lobbying efforts. 
The question for Daimler-Benz was how to best influence 
developments in the European Community. The company decided to to 
open its own corporate office in Brussels. In July 1989, it hired 
an EC lobbyist in Brussels and, in December 1989, it officially 
opened its Brussels office, which included four lobbyists and a 
three member support staff. The office serves as the European 
affairs division of the company, coordinating its responses and 
circulating information on EC policy. At the same time, Daimler 
developed a network of corporate representatives in Bonn, 
Washington, Berlin and Tokyo. 
How can we explain Daimler's choice of engaging in a 
unilateral strategy at the European level? First, the company could 
afford to do so by virtue of its size. It is the largest private 
employer in the EC. Not only does it have resources, but as a 
result of its size, it has easier access to EC officials than many 
firms. Glatz, the head lobbyist for Daimler-Benz in Brussels, said 
they are often contacted by the staffs of EC commissioners and that 
they have a relatively easy time getting information. 40 Moreover, 
Daimler-Benz had the resources to hire Glatz, who has been a 
lobbyist in Brussels for 20 years, and has an extensive network of 
contacts. For firms that do not have the importance or the 
contacts, it is much more difficult to engage in direct lobbying. 
Second, Daimler's diverse economic interests made it difficult 
38Interview, February 20, 1991. 
39Streeck suggests, for example, that German ministerial departments tend to discourage individual fIrms 
from contacting them directly on matters that are dealt with by their national associations. See Wolfgang 
Streeck, "Between Pluralism and Corporatism: German Business Associations and the State," Journal of 
Public Policy, 3 (1983): 265-84. One should not get the impression, however, that no direct lobbying takes 
place in Germany. Automobile company officials do contact ministry officials and the chancellor's office, 
particularly in regard to company-specific issues. 
~nterview, February 19, 1991. 
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to find adequate representation through a single national trade 
association. Daimler-Benz diversified in the late 1980s and 1990s 
and now includes not only Mercedes-Benz, the motor vehicle 
manufacturer, but also Deutsche Aerospace, AEG (the electronics 
company), and the insurance and marketing firm, DEBIS (Daimler Benz 
Interservices) • Again Glatz noted, "We, as a technological 
company, have no specific trade association. Therefore, it is 
important for a conglomerate [to have direct representation]. ,,41 
The firm was thus willing to bear the costs of direct lobbying, 
regardless of whether other firms could free ride on its efforts. 
Third, firms like Daimler Benz were not getting effective 
representation through the two European trade associations 
representin~ the automobile industry in Brussels -- the CLCA and 
the CCMC. 4 The CLCA, established in 1958, consisted of 
representatives of the national trade associations. It represented 
European automakers as well as American and Japanese producers such 
as Ford of Europe and Nissan U.K., who were members of the British 
motor vehicle trade association, The Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders (SMMT). These diverse interests, coupled with its 
unanimity rule, often made it difficult to reach a common position 
on important issues. The second organization, the CCMC, 
represented the European automakers directly and did not include 
Ford of Europe, General Motors, or Nissan. But again the 
organization operated under the rule of unanimity and was often 
unable to reach agreement on major issues. This was particularly 
true on Japanese trade policy, where Jacques Calvet of Peugeot 
blocked any compromise position. EC officials complained that they 
did not know who to turn to for information on policy initiatives 
and even when they did receive information from the two 
organizations, it was often contradictory or useless. As a result, 
the automobile industry as a whole was having little direct 
influence on EC policy.~3 These institutional problems at the 
European level provided Daimler-Benz with incentive to lobby on its 
own. 
Thus, Daimler-Benz's size and diverse interests, coupled with 
its inability to get adequate representation through a national or 
European trade association, prompted it to act unilaterally. 
Like Daimler-Benz, BMW officials initially saw the single 
41Interview, February 19, 1991. 
42n1e automakers do reorganize at the European level and create a single European trade associations 
for automobile manufacturers in Apri11991. See tn. 32. 
43Interview, May 6, 1991. 
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market as having a negligible impact on the firm. BMW gained a 
reputation as a producer of high quality and high performance cars 
during the 1970s and 1980s and had generally seen sUbstantial 
growth in its production in the 1970s. It supported the single 
market initiative and a free trade policy because it was heavily 
reliant on its exports, particularly to the u.s. market. 
But BMW's view of the single market became more cautious in 
the late 1980s, due in large measure to its changing economic 
fortunes. In 1989, BMW sales in the u.s. market declined 12%. BMW 
officials attributed its losses to the Japanese gains in the U.S. 
market, arising both from the Japanese automakers price 
competitiveness and from currency shifts which made BMW automobiles 
more expensive. 44 Like Daimler-Benz, they did not wish to see 
European wide restrictions on Japanese exports to Europe, since 
this would only prompt the Japanese to export to Europe higher 
priced cars, which would compete more directly with BMW's models. 
As one BMW official said, "We don't want it [the market] to go the 
way of cameras. We want to build something.,,45 
BMW officials considered opening their own lobbying office in 
Brussels to ensure that they have influence over the EC's single 
market policies. But unlike Daimler-Benz, they decided in the late 
1980s against this strategy. Instead, they continued to pursue more 
traditional channels of political influence, such as working 
through their national association and regional and national 
government contacts. 
BMW's different response was largely due to the fact that BMW 
could free ride on the political organization of Daimler-Benz. The 
two companies have similar interests in terms of the single market 
for automobiles. They both rely heavily on exports to the u.s. and 
Japan and wished to avoid European wide restrictions on Japanese 
automObiles, which would drive Japanese automakers into their 
market.niche. BMW could depend on Daimler-Benz to represent its 
interests to the Commission. Indeed, company officials told me 
they often allowed Daimler-Benz to formulate positions on single 
market policies. 46 
BMW could also free ride on its regional contacts. According 
to BMW officials, the company has excellent contacts with Bavarian 
government officials. BMW is the largest employer in Munich and 
has contributed to economic growth in poorer border areas in 
Bavaria by setting up production facilities there. As a result, 
44Interview, January 16, 1991. 
45Interview, January 16, 1991. 
4~nterview, January 16, 1991. 
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politicians in the Bavarian government "have an open ear. ,,47 
Bavaria was the first of the German states to open an information 
office in Brussels in the late 1980s. If there were European 
issues of importance to the firm, it could also contact regional 
officials. 
Thus, BMW chose no new political strategy because it could 
rely on its regional contacts and could free ride on the 
organization of Daimler-Benz. 48 
Volkswagen weathered a crisis in the early 1970s in which it 
suffered huge financial losses and had cutback its workforce 
significantly. To recover, it expanded its operations 
internationally and diversified, increasing the number of 
Volkswagen models, and adding Audi models to compete in the upscale 
market, and SEAT to offer smaller models. As a result of these 
economic changes, it became a global auto manufacturer. Thus, 
Volkswagen officials believed it was well positioned to compete in 
the single and open market and did not foresee the EC's initiative 
as having a great impact on its operations. Indeed, VW board 
member Peter Frerk noted, "For the European automobile industry 
there can be no "Fortress Europe" the import of Japanese 
products has not only increased competition, but increased the 
competitiveness of European competitors. ,,49 But by late 1988 and 
early 1989, some company officials were changing their tune. 
Unlike Daimler and BMW, VW's market is concentrated in Germany 
and the EC, rather than in the U.S. and Japan. While the firm 
continued to be profitable in the late 1980s, most of its gains 
were in the markets that were most strongly protected from Japanese 
competition. In 1989, for example, Volkswagen's strongest volume 
markets outside of Germany, were Italy, Spain, France and Great 
Britain. VW officials feared that with unrestricted access of 
Japanese imports by the end of 1992, the company's inroads into the 
47Ibid. 
48BMWs decision in 1992 to establish a public relations and lobbying office in Brussels can be explained 
by a number of factors. First, Daimler's interests are so broad ranging that much of the company's direct 
lobbying efforts in Brussels are directed to areas other than the auto industry, according to Glatz. In 
addition, the national association, VDA, focuses much of its attention in 1990 and 1991 on issues regarding 
unification of Germany and Eastern Europe. Finally, the reorganization of the CCMC and CLCA in 1991 also 
leave the German auto industry with a less powerful voice in Europe, because national trade association 
representatives only have a consultative role in ACEA 
49p. Frerk, Speech to the International Management-Forum, Society of Plastics Engineers in Cologne, 
19.02.90. 
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French and Italian markets, would be eroded. 50 
Second, VW officials found it very difficult to become more 
price competitive. While they tried to reduce development times 
and trim costs, they were still not as productive or cost efficient 
as the Japanese. In terms of product development, for example, it 
takes the Japanese 3.5 years per model versus at least 5 or 6 years 
for VW. And its assembly lines take four times the amount of 
labor. 51 As one VW official put it, "The Japanese have the 
products, productivity, and quality. ,,52 
Trimming costs has also been particularly difficult with the 
high wage costs and union strength in Germany. For example, after 
the Second World War, VW began a practice of sending its employees 
away for 14 days every two years to spas in addition to their 
annual six weeks of vacation. This practice was started because 
workers were not getting enough to eat and were not very productive 
and company officials believed this would help them regain their 
strength. Since German workers no longer have a problem of getting 
enough to eat and it was a very expensive practice, the company 
tried in 1990 to get rid of this provision but labor union 
representatives prohibited them from doing so.53 
Not only has it been difficult to cut worker benefits, but it 
has been difficult for the firm to reduce overstaffing. The state 
government of Lower Saxony, where VW headquarters is located, is 
VW's largest stockholder, holding 19.7% of the company's shares. 
It also holds two seats on Volkswagen's 20 member supervisory 
board. These two state representatives, who are Social Democrats, 
allied themselves with the eight labor representatives on the 
supervisory board to prevent former VW head Carl Hahn from cutting 
workers. 54 
Thus, the change in the perceived impact of the Single Market, 
coupled with the difficulties in making market adjustments, 
prompted VW to change its position on EC policy and engage in a 
more activist political strategy in Brussels. First, whereas prior 
to 1988 discussion of the Single Market at VW was sporadic, in late 
1988 the company set up a European strategy group to examine the 
effects of the single market, draw up reports, and present them to 
the Board of Directors. The reports discussed the position of the 
s<1:nterview, March 18, 1991. 
SINew York Times, March 15, 1993, p. D1 
S2Interview, March 18, 1991. 
S3Interview, March 18, 1991. 
S4New York Times, March 15, 1992, p. D1. 
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company and suggested areas where the company should make 
adjustments. Second, in 1989, the company changed its position on 
the single market. Whereas previously it supported the single 
market wholeheartedly, it now suggested that a complete opening of 
the car market in Europe to Japanese exports would threaten 
European automakers. As one VW official noted, "They (the 
Japanese) could come in in 1992 and press the company against a 
wall ... Why should I have to give up advantages that took years to 
develop, while others work at a lower standard. It is social 
dumping or more.,,55 In order to influence Japanese trade policy, 
Hahn worked with the heads of Fiat and Renault to lobby the 
Commission for restrictions on Japanese exports to the EC and on 
transplants. 
The primary reason that VW pursued a transnational coalitional 
strategy on the issue of Japanese automobiles is that the firm 
found inadequate support for its position at the national level. 
Because the German economy is highly export oriented, the German 
government took a very liberal position on the single market. This 
created some tension between the firm and the government. As one 
VW official explained, the German Economics Minister wanted an open 
and free market, even "against the interests of some German 
firms.,,56 Former Economics Minister Helmut Haussmann was furious 
about VWls change in position. 57 VW concluded that it could not 
count on the support of the German government. 
Second, VW did not have an effective advocate in its national 
trade association on the Japanese trade policy issue. The German 
automobile trade association, VDA, represents both German 
automobile manufacturers and parts manufacturers, and advocated a 
very liberal position in regard to Japanese automobiles. Indeed, 
VDA officials admitted that the association has always been for a 
free market even against the wishes of some of its members. 58 
They argued that in the long term, German industry can only be 
viable if they compete internationally and are not protected from 
outside competition. VW found itself having a much more 
restrictive position than the majority of firms in the association. 
Third, there were similarly situated firms in other EC-member 
countries, particularly Fiat and Renault, which enabled VW to take 
collective action. VW chose not to ally itself with Peugeot 
because company officials felt that Peugeot was too unrealistic in 
its demands -- asking to keep the European market closed from 
55Interview, March 18, 1991. 
56Interview, March 18, 1991. 
57Interview, March 21, 1991. 
58Interview, November 23, 1990. 
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Japanese competition until at least 2010 or until the Japanese 
opened up their markets equally to the Europeans. Peugeot was 
unwilling to compromise with the Commission or other automakers on 
this issue. As one VW official put it, with that type of position, 
"one gets nothing."59 
Fourth, VW could use existing facilities to help coordinate 
lobbying activities in Brussels. They have a finishing plant and 
a services and investment banking center, CCB, in Brussels, which 
help to coordinate contacts to the EC. This allowed them to avoid 
the cost of setting up their own corporate lobbying office in 
Brussels. 
Thus, VW did not set up its own office in Brussels, but, on 
the crucial issue of trade with Japan, company officials worked on 
the European level to build transnational alliances because they 
found little support for their position on the national level and 
because there were similarly situated firms in other countries in 
Europe. While VW certainly could open up its own lobbying office, 
company officials said this was too expensive an option and they 
could depend on existing facilities. 
These three cases help to account for the inactivity of German 
automobile firms in the early stages of the single market and their 
shift in 1989. Initially, the firms did not believe that the 
single market would affect significantly their economic operations. 
If anything, company officials believed it would help their 
operations by allowing them easier access into some markets, as 
well as preventing a trade war with their export partners. 
Moreover, the firms could rely on a strong national trade 
associations, as well as national and EC level government 
officials, to advocate a free and open market. The changing 
economic fortunes and perceptions of the firms, particularly on the 
issue of trade with the Japanese, led them to pursue new political 
activity in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Yet despite the 
fact that they are all within a single sector, these firms did not 
take similar positions or follow similar strategies. Both Daimler­
Benz and BMW advocated a free and open market, but while Daimler­
Benz chose to open its own public relations and lobbying office in 
Brussels and coordinate its EC policy through this office, BMW 
continued to rely on more traditional forms of lobbying and did not 
establish a European division. VW chose to build alliances with 
other similarly situated EC automakers, such as Fiat and Renault, 
to lobby the EC directly on the issue of Japanese trade policy. 
These differing activities are due to the firms' strategic 
positions within the sector, the position of national government 
officials, and the organization and position of national and 
European trade associations. 
59Interview, March 18, 1991. 
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These differing political responses of German automobile firms 
to the single market suggest that we should not limit our studies 
to trade associations or sectors. While trade associations 
certainly account for a great deal of political activity of 
business, firms are important political actors in their own right. 
Moreover, within trade associations, firms may disagree about 
policy, with the result that an association takes a watered down 
position on legislation or no position at all. Individual firms may 
then choose to lobby directly and government officials may turn to 
firms in order to get information on the impact of legislation on 
their operations. Concentrating solely on the activities of trade 
associations or sectors misses this dynamic. 
* * * 
This study raises several important issues with respect to the 
study of European economic integration and more generally the 
relationship between governments and business. First, it suggests 
that we need to determine when firm level studies are more 
appropriate and when sector or trade association studies are more 
appropriate. While the case studies outlined above suggest that 
firm level studies are important when there are a few large firms 
with divided economic interests in a sector, trade association 
studies may be more appropriate for sectors with large numbers of 
small and medium-sized firms, which are similarly affected by a 
change in market conditions. 
Second, this study contributes to the debate within the 
European integration literature on the influence of interest groups 
on integration policy. It suggests that as integration efforts 
proceed, the major actors on the EC level may not be transnational 
organizations which push for further integration. Instead, as 
integration proceeds, there is likely to be increased activity by 
individual firms and national associations on the European level 
because European or national trade association representatives may 
not be able to agree on specific EC policy proposals. 
Third, this study suggests that political activity of firms 
will continue in both Brussels and member states. Some firms will 
continue to lobby primarily at the national and regional level, 
while others focus on the transnational level. But the lobbying 
that occurs at the European level may affect the strategies that 
other firms pursue as indicated by BMW's decision to free ride on 
the direct lobbying efforts of Daimler-Benz in the late 1980s. 
This reinforces the view that firms, trade associations and 
government officials are involved in a dual level or nested game, 
in which actions at one level affect strategies at another 
22 
level. 60 In addition, the study suggests that firms may have to 
undertake different political strategies in the European and 
national arenas. For example, on the national level, German 
companies tend to work through their trade associations on industry 
level issues. Trade association officials are formally consulted 
by government officials on policy initiatives. In Brussels, there 
is little that is official, although consultation often occurs. It 
depends, according to one lobbyist, more on the good will of the 
directorate general. 61 At the same time, there may be more room 
for influence in Brussels. As one lobbyist explained, "In Bonn 
there are seldom large new steps taken. In Brussels, they often 
create something out of nothing. ,,62 In order to effectively 
influence Ee policy, firms may have to learn new ways of lobbying. 
They will have to rely more on their own initiative and cUltivate 
Ee contacts. Such differences between the Ee and the national 
level highlight the need to study the political activities of firms 
in both arenas. 
Finally, this research provides us with clues about how new 
patterns of lobbying evolve and develop. It helps us to understand 
the basic decisions that lead firms to engage in new political 
strategies such as setting up new lobbying offices or building 
transnational alliances. The next question will be how and why 
these new patterns of lobbying become institutionalized and what 
effect they actually have on Ee integration policy. 
6Opor a discussion of dual level games, see George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in 
Comparative Politics. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); and Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games," International Organization 43 (Summer 1988): 427­
460. 
61Interview, February 28, 1991. 
62Interview, February 28, 1991. 
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